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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARJORIE BROWN, JOYCE 
BROWN and LINDA MAE 
BROWN, Minors, by and Through 
Their Guardian Ad Litem, 
HERBERT BROWN, JR., 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
-vs.-
ALAN D. FRANDSEN, Administra-
tor of the ESTATE OF NATHAN 
BREWER, Deceased, 
Def endard-Respondent. 
Case 
No.10687 
APP·ELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to recover for personal injuries 
sustained in a single car upset against the estate of the 
driver who was killed in the same occurrence. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
Frandsen was appointed Administrator of the Estate 
of Na than Brewer, the deceased driver, and this action 
was filed by Marjorie Brown and her three minor chil-
dren, Joyce, Sharon and Linda Mae. 
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After certain dis<:'overy process hereafter ref erred 
to, the case reached issue. Defendant filed motion for 
summary judgment which ·was argued June 9, 1966. 
June 13, 1966, clef endant 's motion for summary 
judgment was granted and the causes of action ·were dis-
missed, from which order this appeal is taken. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the trial court and a trial 
on the merits of their causes of action before a jury. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are best stated by setting forth the Find-
ings of Fact entered by the trial court: 
1. The defendant is the Administrator of the Es-
tate of Nathan Brewer, deceased. The plaintiffs Mar-
jorie Brown, Joyce Brown, Sharon Brown and Linda 
Mae Brown are the daughter and grandchildren, re-
spectively, of the decedent, and they, together with the 
decedent's wife, M.rs. Mary Brewer, and her sister, were 
riding as guests in the decedent's automobile on a trip 
from La Puente, California, to a point near \Vashing·-
ton, D. C. 
2. The Brewer automobile departed from La Puen-
te, California, during the afternoon of vVednesday, Sep-
tember 16, 1959, and arrived at Las Vegas, N evacla, at 
approximately 11 :00 p.m. Motel rooms were hired for the 
night and everyone was asleep by about midnight. Al-
tl10ug·h the decedent may have spent a somewhat restless 
night, he did not arise until 6 :00 or 7 :00 a.m. on the morn-
ing of Thursday, September 17, 1959. 
3. The group checked out of the motel and had break-
fast in Las Vegas before continuing their journey. They 
ani\'N1 at St. George, Utah, at about noon, after having 
purehased fruit, milk, and a few things to eat in one of 
the communities near St. George. At St. George, they 
stopped in a public park for about an hour to have lunch, 
after ·which the children played and the adults "sort of 
took it easy.'' They then filled up with gas and resumed 
their travel. Near Cedar City, Utah, the decedent, who 
had driven from Las Vegas, stopped at a stand for a 
drink of fruit juice, then got back in his car to drive on 
northward. 
4. As the car traveled north from Cedar City all of 
the occupants fell asleep, except the decedent, who was 
driving, and Marjorie Brown, who talked to him and then 
began dozing, although she was not asleep. The decedent 
did not say he was sleepy or indisposed and nothing in his 
driving in the Los Angeles area before the trip or during 
the trip was ont of the ordinary or unsafe. He did not 
drink intoxicants. His speed on the open road through-
out the trip had been about 60 miles per hour and ap-
peared to be about the same just before the accident. 
5. ·with the other occupants asleep and she herself 
}wing in a sitting position with eyes closed, head forward, 
and dozing Marjorie Brown heard the car rolling on 
gravel and supposed that the decedent was going to bring 
the car to a stop on the edge of the roadway. She noticed, 
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however, that the car seemed to be going too fast to stop. 
Before she could open her eyes to see what was going on 
or to observe her father's condition or actions, she felt 
two separate impacts and then lost consciousness. 
6. The accident, which occurred at about 2 :15 p.m. at 
a point 10.8 miles north of Paragonah, Utah, resulted 
when the Brewer automobile, traveling in a long gradual 
arc to the left, crossed the opposite or southbound lane of 
travel and the gravel shoulder of the roadway, proceeded 
on adjacent ground below road level and then struck the 
raised bank of an intersecting roadway which was built up 
to the level of the main highway. The decedent 1cas 
knocked unconscious in the accident, never regained con-
sciousness and died approximately one hour after the ac-
cident. (Emphasis supplied) 
7. At the time of his death, the decedent was 68 
years of age and a minister in the Seventh Day Adventist 
Church at Washington, D. C. He was in good health 
and he was a careful driver. On one occasion several 
years before he had gone to sleep for a second or two on 
the road while driving and thereafter, according to his 
\vife, he was afraid of driving while sleepy. At no time 
before the accident was he ever observed to have acted 
or driven his car in an unusual or unsafe manner. He 
was never cautioned concerning his driving by m1y occu-
pant of the car. There were no witnesses to the accident 
or to the condition or conduct of the decedent just prior 
to the accident, although plaintiff Marjorie Brow11 had 
been talking to him a few moments beforehand. 
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8. There is no direct evidence of what occurred to 
the decedent which caused the car to leave its direct path 
and to crash. Mediral testimony of Dr. R. R. Merliss 
and Dr. R. J. Walker, physicians licensed to practice in 
California, who had not treated decedent, but who had 
testified at the instance of plaintiffs upon deposition and 
had expressed medical opinions based upon assumed facts 
in this case, indicates the medical probability that thP 
der-edent fell asleep, and the court therefore assumes and 
finds, for the purposes of the determination of this mo-
tion for summa.ry judgment, that the decedent fell asleep. 
(Emphasis supplied) 
9. There is no direct evidence that the decedent knew 
he was sleepy or drowsy or might fall asleep but never-
tl1el ess continued to drive, nor is there direct evidenre 
that he did not use due care for his safety or that of his 
guests. 
10. The pretrial judge determined the plaintiffs were 
guests of the decedent, within the meaning of Title 41-9-1, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
ARGUMENT 
SLEEP BY A DRIVING MOTORIST CONSTI-
TUTES WILLFUL MISCONDUCT UNDER 
THE UTAH GUEST STATUTE, 41-9-1, UCA, 
1953. 
The Court found, for the purposes of defendant's 
motion for summary judgment, that decedent's falling 
asleep was the causative factor of resultant injuries to 
plaintiffs. (Findings of Fact No. 8) The Court found the 
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decedent was knocked unconscious in that accident and 
died an hour after, never having regai11ed consciousness 
(Findings of Fact No. 6). 
This appears to be a case of first impression in Utah. 
In 1945, this Court in State v. Olsen, 108 Utah 377, 
160 Pac. 2nd 427, sustained a conviction of involuutarr 
manslaughter against a truck driver who went to sleep 
while driving, causing the truck to jump a curb and go 
onto a sidewalk killing a child. The Court held that 
under the state of Utah law at that time, it was neces-
sary to show that defendant was driving in "marked 
disregard for the safety of others,'' citing State v. Ling-
man, 97 Utah 180, 91 Pac. 2nd 457. 
In sustaining Olsen's conviction, the Court quoted 
with approval the case of Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 
585, 131 Atlantic 432, 44 ALR 785: 
''In an ordinary case, one cannot go to sleep while 
driving an automobile 'vithout having relaxed the 
vigilance which the law requires, without having 
been negligent. It lies within his own control to 
keep awake or cease driving. And so the mere 
fact of his going to sleep while driving is a proper 
basis for an inference of negligence sufficient to 
make out a prima facie case, and sufficient for a re-
covery, if no circumstances tending to exc~se or 
justify his conduct are proved. If such circum-
stances are claimed to have been proved, it then 
becomes a question of fact whether or not the 
driver was negligent; and, determining that issue, 
all the relevant circumstances are to be considered, 
including the fact that ordinarily sleep does not 
come upon one without warning of its approach. 
5 Wigmore, Evidence (2nd Edition), Sec. 2491." 
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The Court went on citing other authorities to the 
same effect and concluded at page 429: 
'' VV e think the jury could find such conduct to be 
negligence manifesting a marked disregard for the 
safety of others on the highway. Were this not 
the rule, the negligent driver of an automobile 
would better sleep while driving and avoid crimi-
nal and civil responsibility than remain awake and 
he responsible for his acts of negligence. The evi-
dence presented an issue for the jury and is suffi-
rient to sustain their verdict.'' 
After State v. Olsen, the legislature enacted a new 
negligent homicide statute in 1955, 41-6-43.10, UCA, 1953, 
which defines the term as ''the driving of any vehicle in 
reckless disregard of the safety of others.'' 
In 1960 Joseph Berch told was prosecuted by the 
State of Utah under the 1955 statute, and was convicted 
by the jury for causing the death of a passenger. Con-
viction was sustained in State v. Berchtold, 11 Utah 2nd 
208, 357 Pac. 2nd 183. Speed, not sleep, was the alleged 
''reckless disregard for the safety of others.'' 
The Court stated in Berchtold at 357 Pac. 2nd 187: 
"Our statute only requires reckless disregard for 
the safety of others, which is a much greater lack 
of care than ordinary negligence, but does not re-
quire as great a consciousness of danger confr~n~­
ed as willful misconduct required to create cIV1l 
liability under our guest statute. To be "reckless" 
does not require "willfulness" but means rather 
heedless careless, and rash inadvertance to con-
sequenc~s. Recklessness may include willfulness." 
(Emphasis supplied) 
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Reference to the guest statute in commenting upon 
the validity of a criminal, homicide conviction is dicta 
' 
and appellants urge this Court to adopt the vievv that the 
terms ''marked disregard,'' ''recklessness,'' ''gross neg-
ligence,'' and ''willful misconduct'' are all synonyms. 
Appellants submit that attempted distinctions are seman-
tic palaver which result in the most artificial kind of legal-
istic jingo. All of the terms presuppose an apprehension 
of a possible bad end result and either a desire to obtain 
it or intentional disregard of the probability of its hap-
pening -all of which type conduct is willful, grossly neg-
ligent, reckless and in marked disregard for the safety of 
others. 
The subject of sleep and civil responsibility is ex-
tensively annotated at page 12, et seq. 28 ALR 2nd. Com-
mencing at page 62 of 28 ALR 2nd, there are cases set 
forth that it is stated stand for the proposition that there 
is unanimous agreement that the driver of an automobile 
that falls asleep while driving is ''grossly negligent'' if 
he had some prior warning of the likelihood of his going 
to sleep. That statement disregards what this Court 
should judicially notice, and that is that human expe-
rience teaches that sleepiness does not suddenly approach 
without prior warning. 
In a concurring opinion m State v. Olsen, .Justice 
Wade stated at 431of160 Pac. 2nd: 
"I therefore conclude that the fact of falling 
asleep while driving, in the abs_ence of furtl:er 
showing to the contrary, is sufficieht from which 
the jury might infor that the d~ive~ had _felt sleep 
coming on but continued to dnve m spite of the 
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warning and in so doing acted rn marked disre-
gard of the safety of others.'' 
In Bushnell v. B1lshnell, quoted with approval by our 
Court in State v. Olsen, infra, the medical basis of the 
holding that approaching sleep is indicated by premoni-
tory symptoms, there was quotation from Purves 8te1c-
art, Diagnosis of Nervous Diseases, Third Edition, page 
423, which states: 
''Firstly, there is a diminution and then loss of 
conscious recognition of ordinary stimuli, such as 
would ordinarily attract our attention, whether 
these stimuli be derived from the outer world or 
from within the sleeper's own organism. There is 
also, as consciousness is becoming blunt, a char-
acteristic and indescribable sense of well being. 
Voluntary movements become languid and ulti-
mately cem;e, and the muscles of the limbs relax. 
Meanwhile there develops double ptosis or droop-
ing of the eyelids; the pupils contract; the respira-
tory movements become slo"'er and deeper, the 
pulse is slowed, the cutaneous vessels dilate to a 
slight extent and the general temperature of the 
body falls, whilst many processes of metabolism, 
such as those of digestion and certain secretions 
are retarded. Particularly would this be true where 
the onset of sleep is due to the prolonged action 
of uniform excitant, associated with little volun-
tary movement and a large degree of muscular re-
laxation, acting upon one who has become more 
or less fatigued and is sitting dmvn in a warm at-
mosphere .. Sleep in such a situation does not ordi-
narily come upon one unaware and by watching 
for i~dications of its approach, or heeding circum~ 
stances which are likelv to bring it about, one may 
either ward it off or C
0
ease an activity capable of 
danger to himself or to others. There are few 
ordinary age11ries so fraught with danger to life 
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and P_roperty as a.n automobile proceeding up0 ,11 
th~ highway freed of the direction of a con,c;cioits 
mind, and because this is so, reasonable care to 
avoid such a danger requires very great care." 
(Emphasis supplied) 
Appellants urge that to ignore those warnings and 
continue driving is willful misconduct. 
The effect of the holdings in State v. Olsen, infra, and 
Bushnell v. Bushnell, infra, is really an application of the 
doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitor. Appellants-Plaintiffs were 
permitted to amend each complaint to state as an addi 
tional ground for civil liability, Res Ipsa Loq11itor (para-
agraph 2, Pretrial Order). 
The application of the doctrine as appellants urge it 
would be that showing sleep, without more, is sufficient 
evidence of willful misconduct to go to the jury to deter-
mine if, in fad, the sleepy driver had no warning of im-
pending sleep. 
That precise position and application of Res lpsa 
Lo quit or by name in a "guest statute" case has been sus-
tained in only one instance that appellants have been ahle 
to find. 
1It is Collins v. McClure, 56 NE 2nd 171. The Ohio 
' Court applied the doctrine in this 1944 case under its 
1 guest statute, and permitted the mere fact of sleep to go 
to the jury to determine "willful or wanton misconduct," 
pursuant to Ohio's Code Section 4515.02. 
Intoxication of a driver is commonly considered to 
be ''willful misconduct'' and is a ground for awarding a 
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guest damages under our Guest Statute, as is high speed, 
:rnpra State v. Berchtold. 
Appellants urge the Court that continuing to drive 
when sleepy and then going to sleep, in view of impossi-
l;il ity of sleep without premonitory warning, also consti-
tutes willful misconduct. 
Is the law and the ruling of the Court below reason-
able in stating, in view of the Olsen case, that a driver is 
guilty of homicide for killing a stranger by sleeping but 
not civily liable to severely injured passengers~ 
Such holding constitutes a non sequitor, and is a 
erucl anomaly. It gives protection for bad conduct. It 
rewards sleepy drivers willing to gamble with the lives 
and health of their passengers, or at least, furnishes them 
and their insurance carriers a shield behind which they 
ean rceklessly gamble the lives of guests, if they choose, 
and be protected if they lose their gamble. 
This Court should adopt, as law, the medical conclu-
sion of Purves Stewart: 
''There are few ordinary agencies so fraught with 
danger to life and property as an automobile pro-
ceeding upon the highway freed of the direction of 
a eonscious mind * * *. '' 
,\fost certainly, if going to sleep while driving and 
thus killing a guest is a sufficient offense against the 
peace and the dignity of the State of Utah to warrant the 
imposition of a jail sentence and the name of criminal 
homieide it certainly should be a sufficient offense against ' . 
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individual citizens who may he ouly maimed by that same 
criminal conduct to enable them to recoYer their financial 
losses and losses for pain and suffering in a civil action 
based upon ''willful misconduct.'' 
As set forth in State v. Bechtold, infra, recklessness 
may include willfulness. This Court should extend the 
State v. Olsen rule that going to sleep while driving, with-
out more, is "reckless," and that this type of reckless-
ness meets the statutory test of ''willfulness.'' Such 
holding could be made without disturbing semantic dif-
ference between the terms "recklessness" and "willful-
ness,'' and would result in a rule of reason, recognizing 
humanitarian doctrine based on reality - not strained 
language construction - not ignoring what we all know: 
Sleep does not come on without warning, and to continue 
to drive a two-ton steel juggernaut is hot only criminal, 
but will found a civil action to recover for injuries caused 
to innocents. 
It is respectfully submitted that a sleepy driver is a 
greater hazard on the highway than is a statutory drunk; 
one having .15% alcohol-blood content ( 41-6-44(3), 1953 
UCA). Of course, being drunk is in the same category as 
willful misconduct, permitting recovery to an injure(l 
guest under Utah Statutes (41-9-1, 1953 UCA). 
It is respectfully submitted that in most instances a 
statutory drunken driver, at the minimum range of the 
statutory presumption, is no more impaired than a sleepy 
driver, but a sleepy driver is at once capable of imme-
diate and total incapacity, subjecting everyone 011 the 
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highway as well as himself and his guests or passengers 
to death or terrible injuries that are just as final to those 
dead or hurt as if administered by one who had been con-
suming martinis. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants urge the Court to adopt a rule that rec-
ognizes reality - no one goes to sleep without forewarn-
ing. If the driver chooses to gamble with sleep, that con-
duct should be labeled willful misconduct, permitting 
guests to recover for injuries which result from the driv-
er's miscalculated risk if he goes to sleep. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE E. BRIDWELL 
506 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-
Appellants 
Received two true copies hereof this 
of October, 1966. 
day 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Attorney for Respondent 
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